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ABSTRACT
Neighbourhood planning is progressing in England and now encompasses 
over 2500 groups, of which over 700 have a “made” Neighbourhood Plan approved 
by a majority vote in a local referendum.  London remains an anomaly with retarded 
progress and evidence of council obstruction.  In the context of national research, 
the model of community organisation, in the form of “neighbourhood forums” devised 
under the Localism Act 2011 to deliver neighbourhood planning, is deeply flawed.  A 
neighbourhood planning index has been produced to indicate the varied progress by 
London boroughs.  Evidence is presented essentially of devolution denied, and 
antipathy to “community localism”, even though, in two boroughs devolution has 
been enabled.
There have always been two distinct purposes to neighbourhood planning and 
this is explicit in the original framing of the Localism Act 2011.  Neighbourhood 
planning is one of the several measures on offer to communities by way of 
“empowerment”.  Neighbourhood planning is the most radical and popular measure, 
but the “town planning” aspect as such, is fairly low profile and a minority component 
in the considerable research devoted to the implementation and consequences of 
the Act, and to localism policy more generally.  The critical issue for scholars and 
commentators, and possibly for practitioners on the ground, is the nature and extent 
of community engagement; not planning and land use issues per se.  To achieve 
genuine engagement and collective action there is an imperative that partisan 
interests do not prevail.  Inevitably however, creating an empowered space for 
collaborative planning is highly political, and not merely a technical enterprise.  
Whether it is arguing about where to site a Tesco Local, or disagreements about 
community-led housing, the peaceful resolution of conflict, so as to produce an 
agreed policy, is the practice of politics.  So, what is the extent of neighbourhood 
planning take-up and what is the nature of any resulting empowerment?  The original 
promise was clear; ‘a fundamental shift of power…. Towards local people’ (HM 
Government 2010 p.11).  Although the emerging picture is of a steadily advancing, 
citizen-led third tier of planning, the reality is of an urban sluggishness that contrasts 
to the rural pace-makers.  It is very clear that this definite two-speed movement 
results from the distinction between the planning groups based on already 
constituted parish councils, and the self-starter groups in cities, required to obtain 
“designation” by their local council.  These “neighbourhood forums” lack the 
resources, authority and support available to the mainly rural parish councils.  To 
compensate for the absence of the parish council with its council tax precept, and 
other advantages, primary city councils (borough councils in London) have a 
statutory “duty to support” neighbourhood forums.  Evidence suggests this support is 
not always forthcoming.  The extent of this difference in take-up of neighbourhood 
planning is relatively easy to discern, even if more complex metrics such as progress 
through stages, mobilisation and the dynamics of engagement have rarely been 
assessed.  The latest aggregate progress in England encompasses over 2500 
groups, of whom over 700 have “made” a neighbourhood plan, approved by a 
majority vote in a local referendum.  The cities, reliant upon neighbourhood forums 
on the other hand, are in the slow lane; Manchester and Liverpool have no made 
plans, and London has only 12.   In proportion to population, in London there are 
less than one tenth of the made plans than in the rest of England.   There has been 
little analysis and little explanation of London’s tardiness, nor of the politics at play.  
Nationally the implementation of neighbourhood planning and the politics of 
neighbourhood planning have been subject to considerable research attention, both 
empirically and theoretically.   This context will be explored briefly in the next two 
paragraphs, highlighting some of the more salient findings.  Lastly, what little is 
known and understood about London’s anomalous progress will be set out in the 
light of available theory and best practice.
There are two substantial evidence-based reports examining neighbourhood 
planning nationally; one academic, from Professor Parker and colleagues at the 
University of Reading (Parker et al 2014), and one from a commission under Lord 
Kerslake, sponsored by Locality.  Both are empirical, but the commission 
enthusiastically called for neighbourhood planning to be re-invigorated, wanting: 
“power to be pushed down to the local level, unleashing the creatively and expertise 
of communities ((Locality 2018 p.5).  From survey and interview evidence, both 
reports found successful community involvement and strong endorsement of 
neighbourhood planning.  Problems were identified with a lack of resources, with 
unequal take-up, depending upon levels of poverty, and concerns about how 
inclusive and representative planning groups are, or not, of their local areas.  
Ambiguity about the “duty to support” and evidence of council obstruction were 
commonly found, and the necessity of council support for parish councils and even 
more so for the forums was emphasised.  Neither report looked at cities in general 
nor London in particular (in effect, the neighbourhood forum contingent), and both 
empirical reports were remiss in not seeking and interrogating the hidden cohort of 
non-starting or stalled groups.  The London anomaly was unexplored.  There is a 
range of theoretical work, some based solely on the legislation and policy; some 
relying on case study; or otherwise on more comprehensive evidence.  Parker et al 
have made the most numerous contributions to the latter (see for example Parker et 
al 2014; Parker and Salter 2016; ditto 2017; and Wargent and Parker 2018).  Several 
authors take a negative stance on neighbourhood planning (or localism) describing 
anti-political effects and imputing such intensions to a neoliberal project (see 
Williams et al 2014; Clarke and Cochrane 2013; Ludwig and Ludwig 2014).  Davoudi 
and Madanipour (2015) warn of the co-option of neighbourhood planning by vested 
interests and criticise the lack of legitimacy of the neighbourhood forums.  They 
suggest that neighbourhood planning can however be “progressive” depending upon 
local circumstances.  Several authors (including Parker et al) acknowledge a 
neoliberal paradigm but supply qualified support to neighbourhood planning, 
caveated with the empirically verified cautions about lack of resources, and issues 
with inclusivity and inequality (see Bradley 2017; Sturzaker and Shaw 2015; and 
Bailey and pill 2015).  There are authors who more directly endorse localism such as 
Stoker (2006) in his defence of representative democracy, and Wills (2012) in her 
mainly London-based exploration of new forms of neighbourhood statecraft.  Even 
so, the success or failure of neighbourhood planning in London, given the ambiguity 
of the “duty to support”, might be best understood by looking at the intersection of 
studies of neighbourhood planning and studies in local governance.
A useful distinction can be made between forms of “community localism” 
implying a degree of political self-efficacy by communities, and “representative 
localism” where the power, authority and resources of an elective institution are 
deployed.  Evens et al (2013) classify localism in this way; where community 
localism enables collective engagement directly in decision-making, equated with 
participative democracy and, alternatively; representative localism where elected 
local government takes the leadership role in community activity.  Neighbourhood 
forums are certainly a form of citizen-led community localism.  Parish councils seem 
to follow the subsidiarity principle, with limited autonomy and resources but 
nevertheless constitute a lower tier of representative localism.  The theories about 
governance would suggest that citizen-led community localism should not be 
isolated in any way, but rather part of the governance network (see Rhodes 2007; 
Sorenson and Torfing 2009).  But practice may be different; there is an asymmetry of 
power and a dependency on cooperation and trust between a borough council and a 
neighbourhood forum.  Laffin (2014), doubts that the network model necessarily 
applies, given the reality of hierarchical and centralising tendencies.  The duty to 
support is perhaps meant to be a statutory confirmation of network governance, 
where the citizen place-shapers co-produce the plan with their big friendly borough 
council; or not, as seems to be the case in some boroughs.  It is surprisingly difficult 
to find reference in any research, in the context of neighbourhood planning, to the 
role of the ward councillor.  Surely, with their legitimacy and agency, councillors are 
the buckle which binds community with local government?   It is known that many 
councillors ignore (or should it be, boycott?) neighbourhood planning but there is 
anecdotal testimony of some active support.  Evidence can be found of what might 
be termed a “blind spot” in the perspective of local government about “community 
localism”.  A paper exploring localism by Walker et al (2013) from the Local 
Government Information Unit ignores devolution to the neighbourhood in the form of 
community localism.  A typology of five models of localism supplied by Richardson 
and Dulrose (2013) only allows for a degree of citizen-led collaboration in one type.  
Otherwise institutionally-led localism prevails, pre-empting the empowered initiative 
available under the 2011 Localism Act.  A recent textbook about devolution and the 
future of local government, by former or current professors, dismisses the minor 
provisions of the Localism Act, and ignores neighbourhood planning all together 
(Leach et al 2018).  In a more specific paper, Salter (2018) has investigated councils 
in the comparatively successful South East England region, and identified three 
types of response to neighbourhood planning.  The region has the advantage of 
mainly devolved parish councils but even so, the primary planning authorities can 
exhibit a “deflective response”.  This includes actively discouraging neighbourhood 
planning.  There may be theoretically-based and policy-based precedents and 
reasons why most London borough councils are reluctant to share power with, and 
support, neighbourhood forums.   Community localism, as exemplified by 
neighbourhood planning, is certainly impeded in London.  As the next section 
demonstrates however, there is evidence in London of two pioneer boroughs, where 
the inherent disadvantages of neighbourhood forums can be compensated for by 
genuine implementation of the councils’ duty to support.  There is also evidence of 
direct, if covert, obstruction.
Citizen planners in London are well aware of how little support is forthcoming 
from borough councils and how slowly neighbourhood planning is progressing in the 
capital.  There is an increasingly effective mutual support group however, known as 
Neighbourhood Planners London, which is networking, gathering data, lobbying and, 
recently, sponsoring research.  The pioneering borough councils of Westminster 
(Conservative) and Camden (Labour) are way ahead of the rest in achieving 
neighbourhood planning.  Five boroughs (representing over 1.3 million people) are 
dormant, with apparently no active planning groups.  Using data collected by 
Neighbourhood Planners London, an index has been devised which scores the level 
of activity by group progress through three stages to referendum and “made” plan.  
The index does not allow for different sizes of group populations.  All the groups in 
the borough are scored by stage of progress and the arithmetic total is divided by the 
borough population in millions.  Camden, the most active borough, has a 
neighbourhood planning activity index of 115, with Westminster next on 102, right 
down to the five dormant boroughs on zero.  The average neighbourhood planning 
index is 18.8 for London as a whole.  A table sorting boroughs by this index also 
notes the Index of Multiple Deprivation by borough (Public Health England (2019), 
records party control, records councils with low numbers of opposition councillors 
and percentage of houses in each borough owned outright (Mayor of London 2019).  
These additional factors have been suggested as being associated with 
neighbourhood planning activity.  There does not appear to be any statistical 
correlation however (see appendix).  The differences in activity between boroughs 
may thus result from policy choices by the respective councils. The inherent 
problems for self-determined group to achieve “designation” are well defined in the 
national research and dependence on the local council has made London groups 
particularly vulnerable to council obstruction; there is a play-book of blocking tactics.  
Neighbourhood Planners London (2017) network has surveyed the 32 councils and 
noted that only six Local (borough) Plans fully recognised neighbourhood planning 
and supplied guidance as required.  Complaints about austerity appear disingenuous 
when councils such as Lambeth spend £140,000 on a “refreshed masterplan” in 
opposition to a local neighbourhood planning group (London Borough of Lambeth 
2016). Again in Lambeth, another group publicly objected to a rival plan (called a 
CLIP) produced by the council citing: “locals who are concerned that the CLIP is an 
attempt to undermine a community-led exercise in favour of a council-led one” 
(South Bank and Waterloo Neighbours 2108).  The draft London Plan produced by 
the Mayor’s office barely mentioned neighbourhood planning, even in the context of 
collaboration with local communities.  The plan was considerably modified by the 
Inspector at the Examination in Public (see section 0.0.21A for example in; GLA 
2019).  There are other examples of opposition by omission such as a major report 
on “place-making” by London policy professionals (Future of London 2017), ignoring 
neighbourhood planning; in the same way as a recently published textbook on local 
government devolution did (Leach et al 2018).  There is a dearth of research into this 
London devolution anomaly but there are two case studies of neighbourhood 
planning groups in London.  One finds a neoliberal agenda in place, where 
unrepresentative and wealthy people capture forums to, “reap the benefits exclusive 
to their group solidifying their advantageous socio-economic position” (Apostolides 
2018).  In contrast, a consultancy report sponsored by Neighbourhood Planners 
London (and funded by a charity) found, “Tackling social issues is often the driving 
force behind neighbourhood planning” although, “forums struggle to attract the ethnic 
and social diversity proportional to their area” (Publica 2019 p.44).
There is ample evidence of many boroughs failing to support neighbourhood 
planning, and in some cases obstructing local initiative by neighbourhood groups.  
This hindrance is essentially covert, as councils’ cannot be seen to deny their 
statutory “duty to support”.  There are examples of the local government policy 
community opposing neighbourhood planning by omission.  Nevertheless Camden 
and Westminster demonstrate that devolution by enabled neighbourhood planning is 
actually a policy choice by the council and that the weaknesses in the forum model 
can be overcome.  The problems associated with community localism and 
demonstrably arising in neighbourhood planning practice; lack of legitimacy, 
exclusiveness, unequal access and so on, may be informing council policy, but there 
is little or no debate and a paucity of research about experiences in London.  
Arguably, the 2011 Localism Act is flawed in devising a vehicle for neighbourhood 
planning, in the absence of parish councils, which is fragile and vulnerable to an 
unhelpful local council.  There is no shortage of proposals from the national research 
as to how collaborative planning at the neighbourhood level might be improved.  
Better resourcing through the levy on developers (Community Infrastructure Levy) 
would considerably strengthen neighbourhood forums, and may well be popular.  
The evidence suggests that: the capital city is remarkably retarded in implementing 
the third tier of national planning; that councils are wilfully failing in their statutory 
“duty to support”; that research has not sought out the frustrated communities thus 
let down by their own council; that there has been little appraisal of how far forums 
have succumbed, or not, to problems of deprivation, exclusivity and 
unrepresentativeness; and that the potentially crucial role of councillors is barely 
acknowledged.  Devolution enabled or devolution denied appears to be a council 
policy choice.  In the absence of an open debate, and thorough research, the 
London anomaly is largely unexplored and unexplained.
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INNER LONDON BOROUGHS SORTED BY NEIGHBOURHOOD PLANNING ACTIVITY INDEX
(No correlation found with other factors, thus NP activity may be a council policy choice)






% HOUSES FULLY 
OWNED
Camden 115 15.1 Lab A 18.5
Westminster 102 27.7 Con A 17.1
Kensington and Chelsea 50 23.4 Con A 22.6
Tower Hamlets 28 35.7 Lab 3 7.0
Hammersmith and Fulham 27 24.4 Lab A 19.1
Lewisham 25 28.6 Lab 0 16.5
Southwark 22 29.5 Lab A 10.1
Hackney 21 35.3 Lab 5 11.1
Lambeth 20 28.9 Lab 6 10.9
Haringey 10 31.0 Lab A 18.0
Islington 8 32.5 Lab A 15.4
Newham 6 32.9 Lab 0 9.4
Wandsworth 6 18.3 Con A 17.7
Average Inner London 33.8 X X X 14.6
Average Outer London 8.5 X X X 27.3
London 18.8 x X X 22.0
OUTER LONDON BOROUGHS SORTED BY NEIGHBOURHOOD PLANNING ACTIVITY INDEX (no correlation)
OUTER LONDON NP ACTIVITY INDEX MULT DEPRN INDEX PARTY VIABLE OPPOSITION % HOUSES OWNED
Ealing 29 23.6 Lab A 20.1
Brent 27 16.2 Lab 3 22.2
Sutton 24 14.6 Lib Dem A 25.7
Richmond upon Thames 15 10.0 Lib Dem A 30.9
Enfield 12 27.0 Lab A 25.6
Kingston upon Thames 11 11.1 Lib Dem 9 27.7
Barnet 8 34.6 Con A 32.4
Hounslow 8 22.5 Lab A 25.5
Waltham Forest 7 30.2 Lab A 20.6
Hillingdon 6 18.1 Con A 22.2
Merton 5 14.9 Lab A 21.7
Bexley 4 17.8 Con A 38.1
Croydon 3 23.6 Lab A 30.8
Redbridge 3 20.2 Lab A 29.5
Barking 0 13.6 Lab 0 16.4
Bromley 0 26.6 Con A 37.8
Greenwich 0 25.5 Lab A 19.2
Harrow 0 14.3 Lab A 33.5
Havering 0 17.9 NOC A 35.2

